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There's No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work-
And It's a Good Thing, Too*
James Grimmelmann**
INTRODUCTION
I would like to talk about computer-authored works-I would like to, except that
they don't exist. Copyright law doesn't recognize computer programs as authors,
and it shouldn't.' Some day it might make sense to, but if that day ever comes,
copyright will be the least of our concerns.
Instead, I will say something about why computer authorship is such a "bad
penny of a question," to use Annemarie Bridy's felicitous phrase, even though it is
so utterly speculative.2  The scholarship pondering the possibility of computer-
authored works is surprisingly extensive, even though no one has ever exhibited
even one work that could plausibly claim to have a computer for an "author" in the
sense that the Copyright Act uses the term.3
* This Essay is based on a talk that was given on October 2, 2015, at the Kernochan Center
Annual Symposium at Columbia Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland. My thanks to Aislinn Black, Annemarie Bridy,
Bruce Boyden, Timothy McGovern, Christina Spiesel, and the participants in the Kernochan Center
Symposium "Copyright Outside the Box" for their suggestions. This Essay may be freely reused under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license,
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
1. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES (THIRD)
§ 313.2 (3d ed. 2014) ("Similarly, the Office will not register works produced by a machine or mere
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention
from a human author.")
2. Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 5
STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 1 52 (2012).
3. Bridy, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 50-52; Timothy L. Butler, Can a Computer Be an Author -
Copyright Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, 4 COMM/ENT L.S. 707, 739-42 (1982); Ralph D. Clifford,
Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand
up, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1685-86, 1694-95 (1996); Evan H. Farr, Copyrightability of Computer-
Created Works, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 63, 79 (1989); Dane E. Johnson, Statute ofAnne-
Imals: Should Copyright Protect Sentient Non-Human Creators, 15 ANIMAL L. 15, 19-21 (2008); Karl
F. Milde, Jr., Can a Computer Be an "Author" or an "Inventor"?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 378, 392-95
(1969); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, HARV. L. REV. 977, 1056-72 (1993); William T.
Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: HAL Meets Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
281, 302-3 (2004-05); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated
Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1192-1200 (1986); Andrew J. Wu, From Video Games to Artificial
Intelligence: Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated
Computer Programs, 25 AIPLA Q. J. 131, 155-57 (1997).
Most of these authors sensibly conclude that computers are not authors, for now at least, but it
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My view is that the idea of computer-authored works responds to perceived
problems of deciding who should be considered the authors of computer-generated
works. The difficulty of saying who is the author of a work when one person runs
an unpredictably complicated computer program written by another makes it
tempting to say that the program itself is the author. But this suggestion is
unnecessary, because the underlying problems of assigning authorship are more
apparent then real-or rather, they are no worse here than elsewhere in copyright. I
can imagine five reasons why computer-generated works might be considered
meaningfully different from human-generated works: 4
(1) They are embedded in digital copies.
(2) People create them using computers rather than by hand.
(3) Programs can generate them algorithmically.
(4) Programmers as well as users contribute to them.
(5) Programs can generate them non-deterministically.
All of these distinctions are spurious. Old-fashioned pen-and-paper works raise
all of the same issues; there is nothing new under the sun.5 These issues have been
with us since the Statute of Anne; they will be with us as long as copyright
considers it important to assign ownership of a work to an "author" who is causally
responsible for the work's existence.
I. DIGITAL COPIES
What might we mean by a "computer-generated work" in the first place? The
simplest answer is that since a computer-generated work is at some point emitted
by a computer, it exists in digital copies, as contrasted with traditional works that
exist in analog copies. A book is a physical object that exists in the physical world:
it consists of patterns of ink on rectangular sheets of paper bound together into a
codex. A sculpture is a hunk of marble with physical properties (most obviously,
mass). A painting is pigment on canvas; canvas has a texture and paint has a
thickness. But a digital copy, one might say, is just ones and zeroes; it exists
entirely as an abstract mathematical representation.
This is not even a fair characterization of digital copies. They are still "copies"
is striking how often the question has been asked. The supposed problem has also been much reported
on by experts. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIxTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
5 (1966); COMM'N ON NEW TECH. USES, FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECH. USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 43-46 (1978); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS
IN AN AGE OF ELECS. AND INFO. 69-73 (1986); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE:
COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 112-
13 (1992).
4. This is not to say that these reasons are commonly advanced by copyright commentators. The
first two in particular are straw men. But there is value in knowing not just that they fail, but why.
5. But see Bruce Boyden, Emergent Works, 39 COLUM J.L. & ARTS 377 (2016) (arguing that
works generated by unpredictable computer programs raise authorship issues that are genuinely different
in kind); Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution ofAuthorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM J.L. & ARTS
395 (2016) (giving interesting and challenging examples of such programs and the works they have
generated).
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in the copyright sense: "material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." 6 This definition obliterates any doctrinal distinction between
digital and analog copies. Bits may be abstract and intangible, but memory chips
and hard drives are very much "material objects." Digital copies are not second-
class citizens of copyright's domain.
Of course, a work is stored differently in a digital copy than in an analog one.
The text in a book is legible to a reader who picks it up and flips through the pages,
while the pattern of ones and zeroes on a hard drive is invisible to the naked eye,
even when those ones and zeroes encode the very same novel. But Congress quite
rightly recognized that what matters is whether the work "can be perceived" from a
copy (possibly with "the aid of a machine or device"), not whether it is directly
perceptible when the copy is sitting inert on the shelf. The text of a book is also
invisible to humans unless they take it down from a shelf and look between its
covers.
Even if there were a relevant difference between digital and analog copies of a
work, it would be a property of the copies, not a property of the work itself. Any
"categor[y]" of "authorship" cognizable under the Copyright Act can be fixed in
digital copies with a suitable encoding.8 Literary works are made up of letters,
numbers, and other characters. Those characters can be translated into binary using
standard encodings such as UTF-8. Pictorial works can be broken down into
pixels, and each pixel broken down into the intensities of its constituent colors.
The pitches and durations of notes in a musical work can be represented by
numbers, which in turn can be represented in binary. For musical works with
unusual features,9 an alternative is to write the score out on a piece of paper and
digitize the image of the paper, pixel by pixel.
This last trick shows why the technique works for any conceivable work of
authorship protected by the Copyright Act. "Copyright protection subsists . . .
[only] in works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."10 Any
work subject to copyright must therefore exist in some "tangible medium." That's
enough. Find the "material object" in which the work is fixed and digitize that
object with enough detail to capture whatever aspect of the object embodies the
work. Architectural works exist in blueprints; find a copy and take a high-
resolution photograph. Sculptural works exist in sculptures; find one and take a
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The phrase "any method now known or later developed" makes
emphatically clear Congress's insistence on technological neutrality and its rejection of "artificial and
largely unjustifiable distinctions . . . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases has been
made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51
(1976). The point is reiterated in § 102(a), which protects works "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed." (emphasis added).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
9. E.g., John Stump, Faerie's Aire and Death Waltz, http://farml.static.flickr.com/148/
406258694 e65219a08c o.jpg [https://perma.cc/9NLR-Z5MY] (last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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high-resolution three-dimensional laser scan.
Vinyl purists and other analog aesthetes may insist that analog copies capture
nuances that no digital copy ever can. They are wrong. Human perception is
limited by the capacities of our senses. The human eye cannot see details finer than
about thirty arc-seconds. Digitize a painting at a higher resolution than a person
with her nose pressed up against it can distinguish, and the resulting copy is
effectively perfect, as far as she can tell. The human ear cannot hear sounds at a
frequency greater than about twenty kilohertz; the CD audio standard plays it safe
and goes up to 22.05 kHz. An audiophile who claims she can hear more on a vinyl
recording is right only in the sense that record players add hisses and pops, or, as
non-audiophiles call them, noise.
Of course, some works exist in digital copies and others do not. But the works
that do not might as well have. Nothing important about their status as
copyrightable works would be lost by digitizing them-and nothing important
would be gained, either. Digital copies are convenient for computers to work with,
and they can be remarkably convenient for bringing works to audiences. (Too
convenient, some would say.) But the contingent fact of whether a work exists in
digital copies, analog copies, or both does not affect its status as a work of
authorship: the expression it contains is exactly the same "regardless of the nature
of the material objects . . . in which [it is] embodied.""
II. DIGITAL WORKS
The next-simplest answer to what counts as a computer-generated work is one
that was created using a computer. Some poets write longhand; others type.
Again, we might posit that there would be some relevant differences, as a class,
between works using computers and works created entirely-without computers.
Again, we would be wrong.
Every kind of copyrightable work can be-and regularly is-created using
computers. Take the list of categories in § 102(a). There is specialized software to
create every single one of them:
(1) "literary works": Microsoft Word, Apple Pages, Scrivener
(2) "musical works": Finale, Sibelius, Noteflight
(3) "dramatic works": Microsoft Word again, Final Draft
(4) "pantomimes and choreographic works": Dance Designer,
DanceForms
(5) "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works": Adobe Photoshop, Photo
Booth, Adobe Illustrator, Affinity Designer, SketchUp, AutoCAD
(6) "motion pictures and other audiovisual works": Final Cut Pro, Maya,
Adobe Flash
(7) "sound recordings": Garage Band, Pro Tools
(8) "architectural works": AutoCAD again, Chief Architect, SoftPlanl2
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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As a result, a large and growing fraction of all copyrightable works are born
digital. They are not aberrations from the normal processes of creativity;
increasingly, they are the normal processes of creativity.
Nor is there is a clear dividing line between the creative techniques used by
digital and analog authors. Cutting and pasting is easier and faster on a computer,
but the verbs "cut" and "paste" betray their analog origin. Digital and film cameras
have the same kinds of controls and can be indistinguishable except on close
inspection. Graphic artists who draw with a stylus on a tablet make the same hand
motions as those who draw with a pen on paper.
Anything an author does with a computer she could in theory do without it.
Looping a drum track in Garage Band is quick and easy, but you could do the same
thing with a literal loop of magnetic tape, or with a drummer friend who keeps
good time. Even computationally complicated operations-such as rendering a
detailed three-dimensional scene using raycasting and texture maps-are really just
(much) faster versions of operations that could be carried out by hand. If nothing
else, an artist could step through the computer program, one instruction at a time,
precisely imitating the computer's operations as it supports her creativity. It would
be immensely, almost unbelievably slower, but she could do it. Computers make
some kinds of creativity practically feasible, but they do not make anything newly
possible.
The reverse is also true: any analog creative process can be perfectly imitated
by a digital one. Consider an analog artist, Annelise, who is drawing on a blank
sheet of paper with a pen. Imagine that she has a digital doppelginger, Dennis,
sitting next to her and perfectly mirroring her actions, except that he is using Adobe
Illustrator and drawing on a Wacom tablet with a stylus. Every time Annelise
moves her hand to draw a line, Dennis moves his hand in the same way. Every
time she changes pens, he clicks on the color picker and switches colors to match.
Every time she picks up a brush, he clicks the brush tool instead. At the end of the
session, they will have identical images-and identical works. The two of them
made exactly the same creative choices, with exactly the same results. Authorship
is not altered by the manner of first fixation.
This digital doppelginger thought experiment is constructive: it applies to any
work. All we need to do is observe how the author interacts with the copy taking
shape before her and translate that sequence of interactions into interactions with an
appropriate computer program. Such a program might not actually exist-there is
not, to my knowledge, a perfect digital simulation of the process of chipping away
at a block of marble-but it could, and that is good enough to make the point. We
can imagine a digital creative process that perfectly parallels any analog one, which
shows that there is nothing inherently different in kind about the analog process.
There is an instructive similarity between the digital-doppelginger thought
experiment and the digitization thought experiment described in Part I. Both of
them take something in the physical world and demonstrate that it could have a
digital duplicate that is identical in all respects relevant to authorship. Digital
doppelgingers duplicate a verb-creating-while digitization duplicates a noun-
the copy. Just as the analog creative process yields an analog copy in the physical
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world, the digital creative process yields a digital copy on a computer. This is not
something new about digitally created works. It merely makes explicit a causal
relationship that has always inhered in creativity: a work, as fixed in a copy, is the
result of what an author does.
III. ALGORITHMIC CREATION
A third way in which computer-generated works might be thought to be
uniquely challenging for copyright is that they involve algorithmic creation. Rather
than being produced intuitively through a process whose details are not available
for inspection, they are the outputs of a process whose steps are precise and
explicit.
This is not a distinction that ought to make a difference. True, rote rule-
following does not look like copyrightable creativity; "slavish copying" is not
originality.' 3 But creativity can also inhere in a creator's selection of the rules she
will follow. She can introduce copyrightable authorship through her choice of rules
or through her choice among variations permitted by the rules, and as a general
matter these two kinds of authorship are equivalent. A work does not know
whether it was created freehand or by following rules. The use of rules at all is
simply the choice to split the creative process into two stages rather than one. The
inputs-whatever it is that we mean by "creativity" or "expression" or
"authorship"-are indistinguishable, and so is the output-a fixed copy of the
work.
If an author, for her own convenience, decides to automate some of the steps by
programming a computer, copyright should not look any less generously upon her.
Copyright does not turn up its nose at printmakers who engrave a single copper
plate to make an edition of 500 prints, or on novelists who use movable type rather
than writing each letter by hand. Their creative work is substantially complete by
the time they ink a plate or fish sorts out of a type case; to complain that these steps
are too mechanical to support a copyright is to go looking for authorship in all the
wrong places.
This remains true even when an author acts without conscious attention to each
detail; it is not that her hand is unguided, but rather that it is guided by neuronal
firings in her brain in a way she does not consciously attempt to direct. In this
sense, all authorship is algorithmic. To say that an author creates intuitively is
simply to say that neither she nor we have ready access to the algorithm she
follows. 14
Indeed, the distinction between an algorithm and its output is often irrelevant for
copyright purposes. One of the most fundamental insights of computer science is
the idea that a program-software-is just another form of data.15 That's what
13. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1998).
14. See generally Bridy, supra note 2; Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and
Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 569 (2002).
15. Alan Turing made this point in the article that created the field of computer science; he gave
an explicit construction for writing out any possible program as a string of symbols. See A.M. Turing,
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makes general-purpose computers possible; we can load new programs on them in
the same simple way we load new data. Take an example: Microsoft Word is a
program. It is represented digitally: as a sequence of ones and zeroes. Those bits
are data; you install that data from a CD or by downloading it. In turn, your
computer interprets that data a sequence of instructions, executing them one by one
and thereby causing Word to do what it does. In the same way, a Word document
is also data: a digital sequence of bits stored on a hard drive somewhere. Now for
the crucial move: a Word document is also a program, one that tells Word itself
what characters to display and how to format them. Your computer does not draw
any fundamental distinction between the bits that make up Word and the bits that
make up a Word document. Both are data; both are programs. Bits are bits. We
could regard an MP3 file as a sequence of sound data, or we could regard it as a
program for producing sound. Both descriptions are correct; every digital fixation
of a work is a program for generating that work. And since every work can be
fixed digitally, every work can be generated by a program.
The point is even more apparent when we think about the actual creative
process. Consider again the sequence of steps that analog Annelise and digital
Dennis follow to create pictorial works. Annelise's creative acts look intuitive and
inscrutable, while Dennis's creative acts leave behind a digital trail: the precise
sequence of steps that he followed, as recorded by Adobe Illustrator. It keeps track
of them in case Dennis hits "undo"; the only way to enable him to retrace his steps
is to leave binary breadcrumbs along the route of his creative journey. But now
suppose that Dennis, having repeatedly hit "undo" until he is back at a blank
canvas, decides he likes what he made after all, and starts hitting "redo" until he
has the finished illustration again. In other words, Illustrator's saved undo/redo
information provides a precise set of instructions for recreating Dennis's work from
scratch, one that causes Illustrator to repeat what it did when Dennis was driving-
resulting in exactly the same image. Dennis's sequence of creative acts is a
program for generating the work, and it is also a copy of the work, which means
that so are Annelise's creative acts. All creativity is also algorithmic in the sense
that we could encode the work as a program making completely explicit what the
creator did to produce it.
IV. SEQUENTIAL CREATION
The next potential challenge posed by computer-generated works is that people
frequently use computer programs written by others, which raises the question of
how to allocate ownership of the resulting works between programmer and user. It
is easy to give examples where one or the other has a better claim. On the one
hand, where the program is Finale and the work is a string quartet, the user is the
author of that musical work. Finale's programmers have no more of a copyright
On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, 42 PROC. LONDON MATH.
Soc. 230 (1936). Turing's insight is all the more remarkable for having been formulated before actual
digital computers existed to run those programs.
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claim than the penmaker would if a composer had written the quartet out by hand.
On the other hand, where the program displays a fifteen-second animation of
fireworks whenever the user pushes the space bar, the programmer is the author of
that audiovisual work. The user has no copyright claim because "the program
would have generated the same output no matter which human user caused the
output to be generated." 6
It seems, therefore, that the problem is to distinguish computer users who are
genuine authors from users who merely push a button. But this is not a problem
unique to computers. Even in the offline world, there are buttons and there are
buttons. The user who pushes a button on a music box to start it playing is not an
author; the user who pushes a button on a camera to take a photograph is. Trying
to allocate copyrights between computer programmer and computer user is the
same kind of task as trying to allocate them between thing-maker and thing-user.
These are problems of sequential creation: A and B both make contributions
toward a work over time, one after the other. Who owns the work? It depends.
There are at least six possible legal outcomes:
Infringing copy: If B makes only de minimis modifications to A's work, then B is not
an author in the copyright sense. Copyright in the resulting work continues to be
owned solely by A. If I take your short story, format it entirely in small caps, and
then hit "Save As" to store a copy, I am an infringer, not an author.
Unlawful derivative work: If B modifies A's work enough to contribute copyrightable
authorship, then B is the author of a derivative work. The copyright status of this
work depends on whether B has A's permission, or makes a transformative fair use, or
has some other statutory authorization to prepare a derivative work.17 If B uses A's
work "unlawfully," then A owns the copyright in the portions copied from her
preexisting work, while B's incremental contributions are uncopyrightable. If I do
substantial editorial work on your short story without your permission-rearranging
scenes, adding new expository dialogue, and eliminating an unnecessary character-
neither of us may be able to claim a copyright in these tweaks.
Lawful derivative work: If, on the other hand, B creates a derivative work but does so
"[]lawfilly," then A owns the copyright in the portions copied from her preexisting
work, while B owns the copyright in her incremental contributions. If you gave me
permission to revise your story and copyright the revisions-or if my changes so alter
the story's meaning as to make it a biting commentary on the original-I will own a
copyright in my brilliant revisions and you will own a copyright in your inferior
original.
Joint work: Another possibility in the case where the resulting work reflects both A
and B's contributions is that they mutually intend that their contributions "be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole,"18 making them the co-
16. Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1206-07.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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owners of a joint work.19 If you and I are bandmates, you lay down a vocal track, and
I then add a drum line and guitar riffs, the resulting sound recording is most likely a
joint work.
Sole-authored work: If B modifies A's work or discards portions of it to the point that
the resulting work is no longer substantially similar to A's, and B also makes
copyrightable contributions of her own, then B is the sole author and sole copyright
owner of the resulting work. If I write a screenplay in Microsoft Word, I alone own
the copyright, because the screenplay is not substantially similar to Word.
No copyright: Finally, if B discards A's work without adding anything copyrightable
of her own, the output simply fails to be a copyrightable work at all. Neither A nor B
is a copyright owner; anyone is free to copy it. If I open up Microsoft Word and
immediately hit "print," neither Microsoft nor I has a copyright in what is on the page
that emerges from the printer, because the page will be blank.
These six possibilities range over every combination of possible ownership by A
and B. The resulting work could be owned solely by A (in whole or part), by A
and B together (jointly or in separate portions), solely by B, or by no one.
The problem of allocating ownership between programmers and users is just a
special case of this more general and very familiar problem. Both contribute to the
final form of the work. The programmer goes first, and then the user, but more
than that we cannot say without knowing about the particular program and the
particular user input. The resulting work might be virtually identical to the
program, or it might be virtually identical to the user's input, or it might be similar
to both, but identical to neither, and we will have to inspect the expression in the
program, the input, and the work to say for sure which is the case. The user might
arrange segments of expression supplied by the programmer, as when a Garage
Band user splices together loops and samples that come with the program. The
user might apply complicated programmer-supplied transformations to her own
expression, as when a Photoshop user applies filters that come with the program.
The user might provide her own expressive elements and stitch them together using
an underlying framework supplied by the programmer, as when an Adobe Flash
Professional user makes an animation.
The fact that some of these examples of computer-assisted creation are
algorithmic as well as sequential still does not make them genuinely new in kind.
Offline sequential creation can also be algorithmic. A Spirograph enables one
person to make a design according to a pattern specified by another. So do dress
patterns, recipes, and, for that matter, blueprints. Sometimes, the author of the
instructions is regarded as the sole author of the output; architects own copyright in
built buildings, not the contractors who actually do the construction work.
Sometimes, there is room for the rule-follower at copyright's table: if a
"distinguishable variation" is enough for a copyright in a work created to the plan
of another, I own the paint-by-numbers canvas I fill in, even if I only color inside
19. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
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the lines. 20 We have not thought that these cases raise distinctive and difficult
issues of the sort that would lead us to treat a Spirograph disc as the "author" of the
resulting loops and whirls, or that an origami pattern owns the crane.
V. NONDETERMINISTIC CREATION
The last way in which computer-generated works are potentially different is that
the same program can be run repeatedly with identical inputs to generate different
works.21 Take the 99-cent "Mozart's Dice Game" app for iOS by the developer
Rodskagg. 22 Every time the user taps the "random" button, Mozart's Dice Game
strings together pseudorandomly-selected measures of music to produce a new
piano minuet and trio in a late 19t century style. It is unappealing to say that the
act of tapping the button is an act of authorship justifying a copyright for the user.
But the fact that the minuets are generated pseudorandomly also makes it
unappealing to treat the programmers as the authors, since they did not compose
any particular minuet.
This again is a hard problem, but again it is not a new one. The "Mozart's Dice
Game" app is nothing more than a computer-implemented version of an actual dice
game for composing music. This Musikalisches Wirfelspiel was published in 1792
and apocryphally attributed to Mozart. People were composing music using
nondeterministic processes long before there were computers; there is a rich history
of of artistic creation incorporating variable elements. 23 Indeed, there is a rich
history of creation that is sequential and algorithmic as well as nondeterministic:
the people "composing" music at home by rolling dice were doing so according to
instructions supplied by the game's designer.
It is helpful, I think, to look at how copyright deals with a related case: the one
in which the same person both creates and uses the nondeterministic process.
Consider a composer who rolls dice to choose notes according to a scheme of her
own devising.24 She is a perfectly plausible candidate for copyright ownership, for
three possible reasons. One is to say that she is an author because of her creativity
in defining the process itself. By describing a mapping from the die rolls to
musical notes, she exercises creative control over some aspects of the composition;
20. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
21. In an earlier draft, I referred to "random" rather than "nondeterministic" creation. But see
Timothy McGovern, Copyright Law Would Be Easy If It Wasn'tfor All the Damn Creativity, HERDINGBATS (Dec. 23, 2015), http://herdingbats.blogspot.com/2015/1 2/copyright-law-would-be-easy-if-it-
wasnt.html (critiquing my usage of "random"). As McGovern explains:
Randomness indicates either a deterministic process occurring at a scale too fine to measure, or aprovably random process like radioactive decay, where the distribution of discrete events can beprobabilistically predicted over time, but within any given timeframe their occurrence or non-
occurrence is unpredictable (cite: I asked a physicist!). As computer scientists know, although
we're working on randomness generators, basically the best we can get at this point ispseudorandomness.
22 Rodskagg, "Mozart's Dice Game," http://www.dicegame.rodskagg.com/
[https://perna.cc/S49K-X499].
23. See generally Durham, supra note 14.
24. Cf Durham, supra note 14, at 602-03 (discussing John Cage's compositional practices).
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that is enough, even if other aspects are literally out of her hands. Although this
approach runs into some difficulties in defining substantial similarity and when the
process is repeated, its basic claim is conceptually sound.
25 Transposing this
reasoning back into cases of sequential creation suggests that the composer would
still be an author even if someone else rolls the dice, and similarly the programmer
of a nondeterministic algorithm can be an author of its outputs even if someone else
pushes the button.
A second reason the composer can be an author is that she adds non-procedural
creativity when she writes out the notes onto a sheet of staff paper; her handwriting
is hers in the same way that a painter's brushstrokes are. This rationale reaches
only the way she writes the notes, not the notes themselves, but it too is enough to
justify a copyright. In sequential-creation cases, this reasoning suggests that the
Musikalisches Wirfelspiel player who writes out a dice-generated minuet longhand
is also pro tanto an author. This kind of authorship drops out entirely from
computer-generated works: the imperfections and variations introduced by a
copyist's hand are absent. Hitting "save" to store a digital copy of a freshly-
generated minuet introduces no new authorship.
The third reason is more openly pragmatic. We could admit that a composer
who plays at dice does not control their fall, any more than Jackson Pollock
controlled the fluid dynamics of his paint splatters. They do not "owe their origin
to an act of authorship" 26-but we are nonetheless willing to sweep them into the
composer's copyrights. For one thing, there are no competing claimants. Either
the composer owns the copyright in these aspects of the work, or no one does.
Giving her a copyright does not deprive other authors of their due. For another
thing, there is no great need for public access to this particular outcome. Giving the
composer a copyright in the expression resulting from this particular roll of the dice
means only that anyone enamored of the idea just needs to roll their own. The
composer ends up with exclusive rights over only an infinitesimally small sliver of
the possibility space; the random elements, being random, are exceedingly unlikely
to fall the same way again. Treating the composer as the author in law, even if she
is not the author in fact, is a harmless fiction-and one that avoids the difficult task
of distinguishing the aspects of a work that result from random processes inside an
author's body from the aspects that result from random processes outside of it.
27
The photographer who takes a picture of a chaotic ocean swell contributes
authorship by choosing where to point the camera and when to click the shutter
button, but she ends up with a copyright on patterns of waves and spray that are in
no sense her expression.
25. See generally Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 587
(2007); Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality Standard of
Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791 (2001); James Grimmelmann, Three Theories of Copyright in Ratings,
14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 851 (2011).
26. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
27. See Durham, supra note 14, at 573 (questioning extent to which this distinction is
maintainable). I owe the helpful terminological distinction between authorship in fact and authorship in
law to Annemarie Bridy. Bridy, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 61-68.
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But these simple pragmatic fictions break down when one person carries out a
nondeterministic process designed by another. With multiple humans in the
picture, an "attribute ownership to the human" rule becomes ambiguous. This is
not to say that the rule becomes unusable: we could for equally pragmatic reasons
say that the programmer owns a given nondeterministic algorithmic sequential
work, or that the user does, or both. It is just that we must confront the full sixfold
diversity of sequential creativity cases, which means that no rule can be both
simple and pragmatic.
This problem was latent in offline examples like the Musikalisches Wirfelspiel,
but not a great source of worry. It does not appear that anyone fretted over whether
the game's designer or players had a better claim to copyright its minuets. Two
things changed with the advent of computer-assisted creativity. First, cases of
algorithmic creation went from being literally parlor games to being all around us.
Everyone who applies the Add Noise filter in Photoshop or records a speed run in a
video game with procedurally generated levels creates using a nondeterministic
algorithm written by other people, an algorithm whose inner workings and detailed
effects the user may not even remotely comprehend. Second, the fact that a
computer was involved seemed to offer a way out of the fact-bound swamp of
deciding whether programmer, user, both, or neither qualified as an author.
Perhaps in cases involving pseudorandom creation and limited user input, the
computer itself might be regarded as the author?
This suggestion is essentially fallacious, the solution a mirage. No one, to my
knowledge, has ever seriously entertained the idea that the Musikalisches
Wirfelspiel dice or the box they came in was the author of the resulting minuets.
Why should it matter that in "Mozart's Dice Game" the die-rolling algorithm is
implemented on a computer? Dice are not authors, and neither are computer
programs. It is only the novelty and seeming strangeness of computers that have
encouraged people to think otherwise.
It is possible that some future computer programs could qualify as authors. We
could well have artificial intelligences that are responsive to incentives,
unpredictable enough that we can't simply tell them what to do, and that have
attributes of personality that make us willing to regard them as copyright owners. 28
But if that day ever comes, it will because we have already made a decision in other
areas of life and law to treat them as persons, and copyright law will fall in line.
But unless those mechanical minds also invent workable time travel, their future
existence is of no bearing now. The copyright issues we would face on that far off
day are fundamentally different in kind from those we face today.
28. See James Grimnelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REv. 657 (2016)
(discussing changes that would make it reasonable to treat artificial intelligences as authors and readers
in a copyright sense).
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CONCLUSION
Computer authorship is a law of the horse. 29 It is a special case of a more
general problem, one that presents few new twists on familiar issues. This is a little
surprising. Over on the infringement side of the aisle, computer copies are easy,
cheap, instantaneous, worldwide, and inescapable. Infringement doctrine is in a
state of complete upheaval, one that may bring to an end the three-hundred-year run
of the "copy" as the basic unit of infringement analysis. 30 On one hand, digital
rights management technologies offer copyright owners the option of regulating
uses rather than copies; on the other, open access and peer production ask whether
such regulation is necessary at all. Either way, big changes are afoot. Even back
on the copyrightability side of the aisle, computer programs themselves pose
fundamental questions about the nature of the authorship that copyright protects.
3 1
Programs are dual artifacts-useful texts-and they interleave creative choice and
functional constraint in complex ways. Of course, copyright has always worried
about the line between aesthetic and utilitarian, but computers raise the stakes
because they are such literal-minded readers.
So computers do raise hard problems for copyright-just not here. For all
present practical purposes, new copyright doctrines for computer-generated works
are a terrible idea.32 The problem of assigning copyright in computer-generated
works may be a hard problem, but it is not a new problem. It is hard for the same
reason that copyright has always been hard-it requires us to make objective legal
judgments about the ultimate in human subjectivity: aesthetics. Putting a computer
somewhere along the pathway from brain to brain brings some of these difficulties
to the fore, but it does not change the nature of the question. There are no
distinctive conceptual problems with computer-generated works, because all works
are computer-generated-or at least, they might have been, which is close enough.
Because computer-generated works are no different in kind than other works,
special-purpose doctrines have little to offer. Indeed, they can make things much
worse; the danger of claiming that there is "a" rule for computer-generated works is
that it blinds us to the immense diversity that category encompasses. There can be
no rule treating all computer-generated works alike for the same reason there can
be no rule treating all fair use cases alike: relevant differences require different
treatment. It is only the apparent novelty of computer-generated works that seems
29. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 207
(1996).
30. See Peter Yu, The Copy in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & ACCESS TO
IMMATERIAL GOODS (Jessica C. Lai and Antoinette Maget Dominic6 eds., Edward Elgar Publishing
2016).
31. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308 (1994).
32. To put it idiomatically, computers raise difficult § 102(b) issues, but not difficult § 102(a)
issues. For a recent discussion of the § 102(b) issues, see Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and
Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement (UC
Berkeley Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 2667740), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstract_id=
2 6 6 7 7 4 0
[https://perma.cc/9XG4-52TB] (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
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to call out for new bright-line rules. But that is the same deadly siren song that new
technologies always sing. There is no new categorical rule of personal jurisdiction
on the Internet; there is no new categorical rule for drone overflights; there is no
new categorical rule for privacy on social networks; there is no new categorical rule
for a thousand other technologies, nor should there be. People are always talking
about technology law, when they should be talking about technology facts.
